

Democratic National Committee [DNC] and the executive branch, I am aware of no such investigation pertaining to Members of Congress, and the Democrats' proposed resolution does not even purport to make such allegations. The independent counsel statute plainly does not authorize the appointment of an independent counsel with jurisdiction to go on an undefined fishing expedition to dig up unspecified violations by Members of Congress.

Second, I can imagine no reason—and my Democrat colleagues have suggested none—why it would be in the public interest to initiate independent counsel proceedings with respect to Members of Congress. The legislative history clearly indicates that there are two instances when independent counsel proceedings are in the public interest under section 591(c)(2). The first is where there would be a real or apparent conflict of interest for the Attorney General to investigate a Member of Congress. While we could imagine that there might be instances in which an Attorney General would have a conflict in investigating Members of Congress of the same party, only in the most extraordinary circumstance would an Attorney General have a conflict in investigating Members of the other party. In any event, we are confident that this Attorney General is fully capable of investigating Members of Congress of both parties.

The third reason for initiating independent counsel proceedings with respect to Members of Congress is when "there is a danger of disparate treatment if the case were handled by the Department of Justice," such that "a Member of Congress were unfairly subjected to a more rigorous application of criminal law than other citizens." This danger, however, clearly does not arise with respect to allegations that laws regulating the fundraising activities of public officials have been violated; if the law only applies to public officials, there is no possibility of disparate treatment between Members of Congress and private citizens. In any event, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have not even attempted to articulate why there would be a danger of disparate treatment if the Justice Department were to investigate Members of Congress.

In closing, Attorney General Reno has appointed four independent counsels to date. It is the sense of a majority of the members of the Judiciary Committee that the need to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest, and thereby to ensure the public's confidence in our system of justice, requires an independent counsel in connection with the 1996 Presidential campaign. However, the record does not warrant, nor does the law permit, the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate Congress. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to oppose Senate Joint Resolution 23.

The result was announced—yeas 58, nays 41, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 33 Leg.]

YEAS—58

Abraham	Frist	Moynihan
Allard	Gorton	Murkowski
Ashcroft	Gramm	Nickles
Bennett	Grams	Roberts
Bond	Grassley	Roth
Brownback	Gregg	Santorum
Burns	Hagel	Sessions
Campbell	Hatch	Shelby
Chafee	Helms	Smith, Bob
Coats	Hutchinson	Smith, Gordon
Cochran	Hutchison	H.
Collins	Inhofe	Snowe
Coverdell	Jeffords	Specter
Craig	Kempthorne	Stevens
D'Amato	Kyl	Thomas
DeWine	Lott	Thompson
Domenici	Lugar	Thurmond
Enzi	Mack	Warner
Faircloth	McCain	Wellstone
Feingold	McConnell	

NAYS—41

Akaka	Feinstein	Leahy
Baucus	Ford	Levin
Biden	Glenn	Lieberman
Bigaman	Graham	Mikulski
Boxer	Harkin	Moseley-Braun
Breaux	Hollings	Murray
Bryan	Inouye	Reed
Bumpers	Johnson	Reid
Byrd	Kennedy	Robb
Cleland	Kerrey	Rockefeller
Conrad	Kerry	Sarbanes
Daschle	Kohl	Torricelli
Dorgan	Landrieu	Wyden
Durbin	Lautenberg	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1

Dodd

The motion to lay on the table the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 23) was agreed to.

Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLARD). The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the Senate will be in a period of morning business now, is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be a period for morning business until 3 o'clock.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION TREATY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I rise for a few moments to speak with respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. I notice the majority leader is here. I wanted to try to get the majority leader's attention for a moment, if I can. Mr. President, I know that Senator BIDEN, who is the ranking member of the committee, has been in discussions and negotiations with a number of parties, and many of us who have been deeply involved in this issue for a long period of time are growing increasingly concerned.

I raised the subject of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the floor a couple weeks ago and signaled that a great many of us were growing sufficiently concerned that we are running out of legislative time on this important treaty that we were poised to consider

coming to the floor and exercising whatever rights we have as Senators in order to try to guarantee a debate on it. For years, we have been making an effort to pass this convention or to pass a convention that regulates chemical weapons. The United States of America has made a policy decision not to produce them. So we are watching 161 nations who signed off on this, and 68 of whom have ratified it, come together without the United States to set up the protocol that will govern the verification and regulatory process for chemical weapons and their precursors for years to come. If we are not allowed in the U.S. Senate to debate this and have a vote, we will not have performed our constitutional responsibilities.

I know the majority leader—he and I have had a number of conversations on this personally. I would like to begin now at least to ascertain publicly, and on the record, where we may be going so that we don't lose this critical time. I would like to know if the majority leader can guarantee us that we are going to have an opportunity to vote up or down on this convention, or whether we have to begin to be a little more creative.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts will yield, I would be glad to respond.

Mr. KERRY. I yield, without giving up my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

Mr. LOTT. As the Senator from Massachusetts recalls, this issue was reported by the committee in the last Congress, and I made a commitment in connection with other bills that we would bring it to a vote. In fact, I believe it was scheduled for a vote, or we were moving toward a vote. But for a variety of reasons—and there is no use rehashing the history of it—the Secretary of State called and asked that we pull it back and not force it to a vote last year. We honored that request.

This year, there have been a number of discussions. The President did call and ask that we meet with his Director of the NSC, Sandy Berger, to talk about how we could bring it to a conclusion. At his request, I did meet with him, and Senator HELMS met with him. Other Senators that are interested have been talking with the President's representative. And we continue to work on that. I think some good progress has been made as a result of those meetings. Some conditionalities have been more or less agreed to. Of course, until it is final, it is never final. Some have been agreed to, some are still being discussed, and some probably will have to have amendments or votes on them when it comes to the floor of the Senate.

The Senator is absolutely right. We have made a decision to destroy our chemical weapons. That is a fact. We are doing that. He is also right that a number of countries have ratified that

treaty; some very important ones have not. Not only the United States has not, but neither has Russia. The indications are that they may or may not. Of course, neither has Iran.

There are some real questions that are legitimate questions on both sides of this issue. One of them is, of course, the verification question. How do you verify what some of the rogue countries may or may not be doing? How do you deal with some of the questions about things like the poison gas that we have seen in Japan? How do you deal with an issue like tear gas being used in our country? Also, there are very important questions like constitutional questions with regard to search and seizure in our country. The administration representative indicated, yes, that is an area where there is concern, and we need to work on that. Work has been done, and we continue to work on it.

This week, I met with the chairman of the committee and talked through where we are and how we can continue to proceed on this matter. I have talked to other Senators on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the issue, as to how we can move it forward. I talked to Mr. Berger again and I urged him to do a couple things. One of those things is to seriously address, with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, some very important parallel issues. Although they are not necessarily tied together on a parallel basis, they are related and of great concern. The State Department reauthorization. In the previous year, I think the State Department kind of indicated, no, we don't want to do anything. That is not a tenable position. I don't think that is the administration's position.

I think the new Secretary of State has indicated that she understands and wants to do some of these things and has been talking to the chairman about that. I am hoping that additional conversations are occurring on that today between the Secretary of State and the chairman of the committee. In another parallel issue, for this very afternoon I have been able to call together a meeting of the key players, Democrats and Republicans, House and Senate, on the U.N. reform matters. We met once with the Secretary of State. We are meeting today with the new U.N. Ambassador, and we are getting a process to see how we deal with the United Nations reforms and, of course, the money that the U.N. would like to have from the United States.

So, again, that is a parallel. A lot of people are involved. None of these issues are easily resolved. All of them are very important—what we do about chemical weapons, about the State Department reauthorization, U.N. reform, and with regard to what happens processwise. I know what you are asking there.

It is our hope that we will be able to get this issue up in April. It probably would involve some hearings in the

committee. But action early on, when we come back, to get it to the floor in a way where everybody will be comfortable with what amendments will be offered. There is a possibility that a statute may be offered, or a regular bill, to be considered in conjunction with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

I have given a long answer, but I am saying this to make it clear to you that I am working aggressively to address the concerns on all sides of this issue. I will continue to do so. I know you are concerned, and other concerns are concerned. You may feel that you have to do more. But I have learned over the years that as long as everybody is talking, you are probably making progress, and we are talking. I have also learned that when you have a chairman that has legitimate concerns, you have to give that chairman time to deal with those concerns.

We are trying to do that.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to the distinguished majority leader that, first of all, I thank him for taking the time to have this colloquy. I think it is very important.

But let me say to the distinguished majority leader that during the years that I was the ranking member negotiating this with the distinguished chairman of committee, we traveled over all of this ground. We have had these hearings. The Foreign Relations Committee has had them. The Intelligence Committee has had them. The Armed Services Committee has had them. And we all know sort of what the clouds are that are there. There is no new sort of definition with respect to those clouds.

For this Senator—and I know I speak for several other Senators, and I think two or three of them are on the floor right now—we do not want to wind up in the situation which I have seen previously. I negotiated the agreement that brought us to the floor last year with a vote. We all know we got caught up in the politics of the Presidential campaign, and that predicated that it may not have been the best moment.

The problem is that we run out of time. The clock tolls on us automatically on April 29. We do not want to wind up in a situation where there is an ability on the floor to have so little time left that we can't work through the problems. Recognizing the road we have traveled here, I do not want to come back to a situation where we have kind of sat here while the negotiations are going on and then there is no window of opportunity to sufficiently let the legislative process work its will.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KERRY. I will in just a moment.

I would like to say to the majority leader that we would like to help the majority leader and others to leverage the reality here. What we would like to suggest is that there be sort of an internal date certain within the Senate—we would suggest that date be when we

return—that, between now and when we return, the administration, the chairman, and the appropriate parties have to come to cloture. If they can't come to cloture—

Mr. LOTT. Closure.

Mr. KERRY. Come to cloture on these issues, and, if they can't come to that resolution, this should be on the floor of the Senate for us to deal with in a matter of legislative urgency.

I know, Mr. President, that there is a significant group of us prepared to exercise every right available to us with respect to the Senate business in order to try to guarantee that we have the opportunity to act on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, one thing is that I do not want to mislead the Senator with regard to the probability of hearings. I assume that was a possibility. I do not think it needs long hearings. But I think a day or two—and I have not asked for those or called for them, and the chairman may or may not feel that they are needed.

So I may have mislead when I was indicating that we are talking about another whole round of hearings. I agree with the Senator. I do not think a lot of hearings need to be done again.

But I wanted to clarify that point. I didn't mean to infer that we were going through a long list or that a decision has been made. But it is something that I have asked: Is there going to be a need for a hearing on a day or so before action could occur? It could.

There is another point. I want to commend the Senator from Arizona, Senator KYL, who has spent a lot of time and has worked on these issues when he was in the House Armed Services Committee and continues to be very interested in them. He is very knowledgeable when you talk about article X, article XI, and all of the ramifications. He knows what is in this convention. He has very legitimate concerns, some of which have been addressed in a way that I think the Senator from Massachusetts would agree with and find acceptable. Others are still open, and there is time to work on those.

I want to recognize the work of Senator KYL. He may want to respond or comment on some of what has been said here today.

I just wanted to make that one clarification.

Mr. KERRY. I appreciate that, Mr. President. I know that the Senator from Michigan, Senator LEVIN, is equally as versed and has had a long interest. I know that all of us believe very deeply that where there may be a legitimate question, we are and have been—and I think the administration has been—fully prepared to try to suggest legitimacy. But we can't allow an endless series of questions to be an excuse for putting us in the box where the U.S. Senate cannot perform its constitutional responsibility to advise

and consent on a treaty as important as this one.

So we are in the predicament here where we want to offer a good-faith effort to work through every single one of those particular issues. But we have to signal that we can't do so simultaneously taking away from ourselves our own rights to be guaranteed that the Senate ought to be able to have a vote.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KERRY. I yield.

Mr. DORGAN. I appreciate the Senator yielding.

To the majority leader I would say the power of the majority in the Congress is a power to schedule. There are a number of us on our side of the aisle who have been patient to the edge of our abilities on this issue. And the question that is being asked is, Will we have an opportunity to consider the chemical weapons treaty on the floor of the Senate? What I heard the Senator from Mississippi say is that he hoped that would be the case. I very much would like to hear a commitment at some point today or tomorrow, before we leave, that we will when we return have an opportunity at a time certain to continue the chemical weapons treaty.

Mr. LOTT. As the distinguished Senator knows, if he will yield, Mr. President, the scheduling does to a large degree rest in the hands of the majority leader. But it is usually done in coordination with both sides of the aisle. Like on the Mexico certification, or decertification, issue, quite often it can be objected to. I mean that, if I today proceeded to call up the House-passed version with the idea of offering a bipartisan substitute to it, we would have to get agreement to do that. The other option is to just call up decertification, which we could do, and start the 10-hour process running.

The point, though, is that you have to work with a lot of different parties. And I intend to do that. I think the decision will come up in April, and we will work in the direction to say that we can get it up by a date certain. Once again, I think it might raise expectations beyond what is achievable.

But we are continuing to work on that, and we are going to do it this very day.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to reiterate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes has expired.

Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to finish this colloquy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LOTT. Will the Senator yield?

As further evidence, if I could, I gave the Democratic leader yesterday and members of our conference—and I presume it was given to the Democratic caucus—a list of items that we anticipate we will consider prior to the Memorial Day recess. It includes nuclear

waste, supplemental appropriations, the TEAM Act, comptime, flexitime, legislation regarding chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty, and others.

It is on our list of things that we anticipate will be considered before we come back.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the problem is that this particular convention stands in a different place from all of those other things which the majority leader has listed, and for obvious reasons. The other things don't have a drop-dead date on them which runs into the convention processes themselves, which are controlled by other countries—not by us.

So I think everybody understands how it works around here. We could wind up in a situation where we would have a very long debate. And if we need to have a very long debate, we want to make certain that we have the ability to adequately flesh out concerns for all Members and still not run up against that deadline, or drop-dead date.

So I think what we are really trying today to say to the majority leader is that this has to be the first priority when we come back, or clearly stated as to what the date will be with a date certain.

All we are trying to do is help the majority leader convey that message to parties on his side because otherwise, obviously, we are left no choice but to try to do whatever we can to leverage a date. We are not precluding nor predetermining an outcome. But we are asking for the Senate to be able to exercise its rights and privileges.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield for a question? I wonder if the majority leader might listen because the drop-dead date issue is a critical issue on this, of course, and the Senate should be allowed to work its will in whatever way in time so that, if we ratify, our ratification will be relevant.

My question to the Senator from Massachusetts is this: We do not know precisely the drop-dead date in terms of Senate ratification, assuming it does ratify the treaty. But will the Senator from Massachusetts agree that it is some number of days in advance of April 29?

Mr. KERRY. Yes.

Mr. LEVIN. I am wondering whether the majority leader, if I could just ask, is aware of that fact. Could I ask the majority leader whether or not, on the time of the Senator from Massachusetts, if the Senate does in fact ratify it, that ratification needs to come some days in advance of the 29th in order to meet the 29th deadline?

Mr. LOTT. I am aware that when you have a treaty issue, there are actions that occur after the treaty that could take time. We will have to—at some point we could have a full debate about what that drop-dead date is. That is the point here. It is not a specific date in terms of having to take up the treaty to get the work done, but it is a fact

if you assume some action must be taken, you have to back off that in order to get the work done.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. KERRY. I thank the majority leader for his time on this. We will obviously be discussing it in the next day or so, and I look forward to our coming forward to some kind of mutual agreement. I thank the Chair.

Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I just wanted to also comment on this issue and state that I think we are to the point where it is not responsible for the Senate to go on with its other business if we cannot get agreement among Senators to bring up this very important matter on a timely basis. I think clearly we can do other work while we wait for the time certain to bring up the Chemical Weapons Convention, but if we cannot get agreement to bring it up, then I do not think it is responsible for us to go ahead and proceed with business as usual.

Unfortunately, under the rules of the Senate, the only option available to those of us in the minority is to insist that this issue, which is time sensitive, be given attention by the Senate or at least get scheduled for attention by the Senate before we proceed to other matters, and I would expect to do that in the future. I do think the majority leader is trying to move ahead with this, but evidently there are objections being raised by others. I do not question that amendments will be offered. I do not question that real issues will be raised about different portions of the treaty. That is what we are designated to do under the Constitution, to debate those issues and vote on them. We do have a responsibility, though, to have a final vote on this treaty in a timely fashion, and I think until we can get agreement to do that, it is very difficult to proceed with business as usual.

I yield the floor, Mr. President.

Mr. FORD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority whip.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, let me add my voice to this for just a moment. For many of us who have chemical weapons stored in our State—and there are a good many States—this piece of legislation becomes highly important because certain language we hope to be in this treaty will allow us to look for alternate sources other than burning or destroying by burning. And so particularly in my case, where we have the nerve gas, this treaty becomes vital to us. And to have it timely considered becomes a very important aspect of alternative sources under this international treaty.

So I am here pleading for my constituency to eliminate the so-called chemical weapons. We are being held up for reorganization of the State Department, reorganization of United Nations, this thing or that thing. We are

held up when we have a deadline of April 28 and we have people out there worried about chemical weapons and how you destroy them. We have the answer under this piece of legislation, but we cannot go forward with it.

Mr. President, I hope you will listen to my friend from New Mexico, that there is going to be an effort to bring this piece of legislation up because of the deadline. If we worried about deadlines, we would have a budget. We do not have a budget. But this is an international treaty, and it has a deadline. And for one, I do not want to miss it because of the chemical weapons that need to be destroyed and the way they are to be destroyed so that we might protect your constituents.

I yield the floor.

Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I seek recognition under the time allocated to Senator DASCHLE in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has up to 60 minutes.

Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Chair.

COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, over the last several days of debate in this Chamber we have heard those who favored the appointment of a special counsel say that time is of the essence, and that we should move forward and ask the Attorney General to make this appointment as quickly as possible. In fact, they were so determined to pass this resolution as a bon voyage gift to the President as he heads off to the Helsinki summit that we had to vote today. Today, before the President left, we had to make certain that this gesture was made. Many of us felt this was unnecessary and ill-timed and, frankly, unprecedented, that this type of embarrassment would be directed at the President as he left our shores to head off for a critical summit with the only other superpower with nuclear weapons in the world. And yet those who prevailed on the majority side were convinced that time was of the essence: let us move forward and do it now.

Catching that spirit, I come before the Senate today with the suggestion that we not stop with this resolution but go even further and plumb the depths of the real problem that we are examining here. It goes beyond the 1996 Presidential campaign. It goes beyond the Democratic Party. What we are focusing on is our very campaign finance system itself as used by Presidential candidates, congressional candidates, Democrats and, yes, Republicans.

And so today I am hoping that that same sense of urgency, that same commitment to truth, and that same perseverance that we find changes to win back the confidence of the American people will be demonstrated when I call a resolution before this body in a few moments.

You see, Mr. President, those who follow Federal election campaigns know that there have been some dramatic changes over the last few decades. Federal election campaign costs have increased from an estimated \$2.65 billion in the 1996 cycle—that is a threefold increase over campaign spending just 20 years ago even adjusting for inflation—\$2.6 billion on our campaigns. In the 1995-96 election cycle, the Democratic Party committees raised \$332 million, a 73-percent increase over the \$192 million raised just 4 years before. The Republicans outdid us, as usual, raising \$549 million, a 74-percent increase over the \$316 million that they raised 4 years earlier.

Take a look at congressional races. In 1976, all congressional races in the United States cost \$99 million. By 1996, 20 years later, that \$99 million had mushroomed to \$626 million—more than a sixfold increase.

Soft money. Well, for those who do not follow this closely, it may be a curiosity to use these terms “hard money” and “soft money,” but politicians know what it is all about. Soft money is kind of the mystery money in politics. And has it grown. Take a look at the fact that since 1992, the amount of soft money in campaigns has tripled, from \$86 million to \$263 million.

Stepping aside from the whole debate about the nature of campaigns and whether they are too negative, too personal and too nasty, most everyone will concede that we are plowing more and more money into our political campaigns in America.

There is a curious thing that has to be noted, though. As political campaigns have become longer, more expensive, and more negative, voters have apparently decided not to participate in elections. Consider this. Between 1948 and 1968, 60 percent of the electorate showed up to vote in a Presidential election. Then from 1972 to 1992, we saw a 53 percent turnout, a decline after Watergate. Listen to what happened in 1996, the most expensive Federal election in our history for congressional candidates, senatorial candidates and Presidential candidates, heaping dollar upon dollar in this election process. The voters out there listened carefully and a majority of them decided to stay home. So, for the first time since 1948, we had fewer than 50 percent of the electorate turning out to vote in a Presidential election; 49 percent of the electorate turned out. Is it not interesting that the more money we plow into our election campaigns, the fewer voters turn out?

Consider if you had a company and you were designing a marketing program and you went to the owners of the company and said, “We have just got the statistics and information back. After we spent millions of dollars on advertising, people are buying fewer products.” It might raise some serious questions. Maybe your advertising campaign is not what it should be—and I think the voters tell us that when

they see negative ads. But perhaps the fact that you are spending more on advertising is not helping the low regard people have for your product. In this case, the voters told us, in 1996, in the November election, that they had a pretty low regard for the product, the candidates, all of us.

I think there is a message here, an important message about the future of this democracy. We can talk about special investigations: Did someone violate the law in 1996, Democrat or Republican, and should we hold them accountable if they did? But if we do not get down to the root cause of the problem here, if we do not address what I consider to be the serious issue of campaign finance reform, I can guarantee the cynicism and skepticism among voters will just increase. So, we have heard a lot of talk today about the sense of urgency and the need to deal quickly with this whole question of campaign finance reform. Some of my colleagues have said, “Oh, don’t move too quickly now; let us make sure we make the right changes.”

Let me show a little illustration. How much time have we spent on the issue of campaign finance reform in the last 10 years? Mr. President, 6,742 pages of hearings; 3,361 floor speeches—add one for this one today; 2,748 pages of reports from the Congressional Research Service, 1,063 pages of committee reports; 113 votes in the Senate; 522 witnesses; 49 days of testimony; 29 sets of hearings by 8 different congressional committees; 17 filibusters; 8 cloture votes on one bill; 1 Senator arrested and dragged to the floor—with bodily injury, I might add—and 15 reports issued by 6 different congressional committees. And what do we have to show for it? Nada, zero, zilch, nothing. What we have to show for it is the call for an independent counsel to determine whether someone has violated the laws under the current system. I think there is a lot more to this.

I hope my colleagues join me in believing that if this process of investigation does not lead to reform, the American people will be disappointed. It is one thing to be hyperinflated with moral rectitude about the violations of campaign law. But that is not enough. Just cataloging the sins of the current system, that is not enough. The real test is whether we are prepared to change the system, reform the law, and return public confidence to our democratic process.

There are a lot of options out there. One of those that is frequently spoken of is the McCain-Feingold legislation, I believe the only bipartisan campaign reform bill before us. Two Republican Senators and, I believe, 22 Democratic Senators have come together in an effort to have campaign finance reform. I have cosponsored it. It may not be the best, or the only, but it is a good one. We should consider it as a starting point in the debate.

Yesterday, my colleague from Minnesota, Senator WELLSTONE, Senator